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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050323-CA
v.
BRYAN ALLEN PERSON,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. This Court has pour-over jurisdiction pursuant
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Has defendant shown that the trial court committed plain error in
denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without
holding an evidentiary hearing or appointing new counsel where
nothing in the record suggests that a more favorable result was
reasonably likely had the trial court taken that action?
Because defendant did not preserve these claims below, this Court may consider

them only for plain error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that 6"(i) [a]n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error
was harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable

outcome for the [defendant]."5 State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, % 16, 94 P.3d 186
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)).
II.

Has defendant shown that his trial counsel was ineffective in not
requesting an evidentiary hearing or new counsel after defendant filed
of a pro se motion to withdraw his plea alleging ineffective assistance
where defendant has not identified anything new counsel would have
done differently?
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal

presents a question of law. See State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004) provides that a guilty plea "may be
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made."
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged with one count of aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony, and one count of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second
degree felony (Rl-2). On January 27, 2005, defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated
robbery in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the firearm charge and to not
refer defendant to the federal government for a firearms prosecution (R23, 26-30).

2

Before sentencing, defendant sent a letter to the trial court stating that he wished to
withdraw his plea because his counsel had provided ineffective assistance (R32).
Defendant's trial counsel subsequently filed a formal motion to withdraw but never filed
a memorandum supporting that motion (R33-34). The State opposed defendant's motion
(R35-40). On March 17, 2005, the trial court invited argument on the motion (R43-44;
R59:2). When both counsel declined argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion
and sentenced him to five-years-to-life in state prison (R43-44; R59:2).
Defendant timely appealed (R46-47). The supreme court transferred the matter to
this Court for disposition (R55).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On October 13, 2004, defendant asked a man, Travis Mendoza, for a ride to the
mouth of Ogden Canyon (R60:6,3-4). Defendant told Mr. Mendoza that he was looking
for a lost ring (R60:6).
When the two men arrived at the mouth of the canyon, they began looking for the
ring and wandered some distance away from the road searching for it. Suddenly,
defendant "pulled out a gun and demanded the victim's valuables." Mr. Mendoza gave
defendant his car keys, his wallet, and other miscellaneous property (R60:6).
Fearing that he might be killed, Mr. Mendoza then reached for defendant's gun.
After a brief struggle, Mr. Mendoza was shot in the arm. Defendant ran from the scene,

1

Because no preliminary hearing was held on this matter, the facts are taken from
defendant's Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and from the plea hearing.
3

took Mr. Mendoza's car, and sped off. A short while later, officers located defendant.
Defendant led the officers on a brief car chase. When defendant crashed Mr. Mendoza's
car during the chase, defendant attempted to flee on foot. Officers apprehended
defendant a short distance later (R60:7).
Defendant was in possession of Mr. Mendoza's wallet when he was apprehended.
The gun he had used to confront Mr. Mendoza was found in a garbage can at a nearby
residence (R60:7).
On October 15, 2004, based on the foregoing facts, defendant was charged with
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and possession of a firearm by a restricted
person, a second degree felony (Rl-2). Defendant was assigned a public defender the
same day (R9-10).
On January 27, 2005, defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated robbery in
exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the firearm charge and to not refer that
charge to federal prosecutors (R23, 26-30). During the plea colloquy, the trial court
asked defendant whether he was satisfied with his legal representation; defendant
responded that he was (R60:3). The trial court then discussed with defendant the right to
a jury trial that defendant would be waiving if he entered the plea. The court explained
that defendant did not have to enter a guilty plea and that he would be given sufficient
time to prepare for trial if defendant decided not to enter a guilty plea. Defendant
indicated that he understood (R60:4). Upon further questioning, defendant also
confirmed that he understood the other constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a
4

guilty plea (R60:5). Defendant's written statement in support of his plea also showed an
understanding of the constitutional rights he was waiving (R26-31).
On February 15, 2005, before sentencing, defendant sent a pro se letter to the trial
court indicating that he wanted to withdraw his plea (R32). Defendant explained:
I know I said I understood everything that was going on, but since
court I've been talking to people around me including the contract
lawyer here in Draper prison and have come to re[a]lize that I should
not have taken the five to life. The only reason I did is because my
lawyer said if I was found guilty on both charges by a jury I would
have to do the five to life first and then the one to fifteen. I don't
feel that my lawyer p[er]formed to the best of his ability for me. I
believe strongly that I was rushed through this whole matter and
would like to withdraw my plea.
(R32).
On March 9, 2005, defendant's counsel filed a formal motion to withdraw
defendant's plea, alleging that "defendant feels that his attorney did not perform to the
best of his abilities and that the defendant feels that he was rushed through the whole
matter." Although the motion indicated that it was "based upon Defendant's
Memorandum to be submitted," neither defendant nor counsel ever filed any supporting
memorandum (R33).
On March 11, 2005, the State filed a response opposing defendant's motion (R35).
On March 17, 2005, the trial court invited argument on defendant's withdrawal
motion (R59). At that time, defense counsel confirmed that defendant "still wishes to
withdraw his plea." However, when asked whether he wished to "make any further
argument than that's been submitted," counsel responded, "I don't." Neither defendant
5

nor his counsel requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion or appointment of new
counsel to present it (R59:2).
The trial court denied defendant's motion:
Based upon the submissions that I have, the Court has looked
at the process by which this was brought by [sic] before the Court,
Mr. Person. It is not sufficient to claim that your attorney did not
perform to the best of his abilities and you felt rushed. You and I
had a discussion about this case, I went through what your rights
were in great detail and we talked about that[,] over and over talked
about it. And in addition to that, there were things placed in writing
and I find that there are no grounds sufficient for me to grant the
motion, and therefore, I deny the motion to set aside your plea.
(R59:2-3). The court then sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah
State Prison, to run consecutive to any term defendant was already serving (R59:3-4).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his plea withdrawal
motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing and appointing new counsel.
However, because defendant did not preserve these claims below and does not argue plain
error on appeal, this Court should not reach them. This Court should also reject
defendant's claims because he invited any error when, upon questioning by the court,
defendant not only did not request a hearing or new counsel but, rather, affirmatively
indicated that the matter was ready for submission.
In any case, the trial court did not commit obvious or prejudicial error in denying
defendant's motion without an evidentiary hearing. First, defendant never requested such
a hearing and the record otherwise did not support his motion. Thus, no obvious error
6

occurred in denying the motion. Second, defendant provides no record of what evidence
he would have presented had an evidentiary hearing been held. Thus, defendant has not
established that he was prejudiced by the lack of a hearing.
Finally, the trial court also did not commit plain error in denying defendant's
motion without first appointing new counsel. Even assuming the court committed
obvious error in not appointing new counsel, defendant has not shown he was prejudiced
by that error where he provides no record of what new counsel would have done
differently to make a more favorable result reasonably likely.
Issue II. Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
when counsel did not ask for conflict counsel or present any evidence or argument in
support of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant's claims fail because he
nowhere identifies what conflict counsel would have done differently or what evidence or
argument should have been presented. Thus, defendant has not shown that he was
adversely affected or otherwise prejudiced by trial counsel's performance.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA
WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR
APPOINTING NEW COUNSEL WHERE NOTHING IN THE
RECORD SUGGESTS THAT A MORE FAVORABLE RESULT
WAS REASONABLY LIKELY HAD THE COURT TAKEN SUCH
ACTION
Defendant claims that "the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without appointing new counsel and
7

without granting him a hearing." Aplt. Br. at 10 (capitalization omitted). Defendant's
unpreserved claims fail because he cannot demonstrate plain error.
A.

Because defendant does not argue plain error on appeal, this
Court should not reach his unpreserved claims.

Because defendant did not preserve his claims below, this Court may reach them
only if defendant argues plain error. Defendant has not argued plain error. Thus, this
Court should not reach his claims.
The general rule in criminal cases is that " 4 a contemporaneous objection or some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s].'" State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)); see
also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. This rule "applies to every claim
. . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain
error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^[ 11; see also State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1,
Tf 41, 63 P.3d 731 ("We have often stated that issues not raised at trial cannot be argued
for the first time on appeal. . . unless the petitioner demonstrates that "plain error"
occurred or "exceptional circumstances" exist.") (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). This Court has often declined to review unpreserved claims, where defendant
does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d
1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) ("Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional
circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on
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appeal."); State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 35 n.5, 27 P.3d 1115; State v. Brown, 856 P.2d
358, 359 (Utah App. 1993).
In this case, defendant did not ask the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on his
withdrawal motion, nor did he ask the court to appoint new counsel to argue his motion.
Consequently, defendant's claims are unpreserved, and this Court may reach them only if
defendant argues plain error. See, e.g., Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^j 41; Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
If 11. Defendant has not argued plain error here. See Aplt. Br. at 10-15. Thus, this Court
should not reach defendant's claims. See Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 35 n.5; Pledger, 896 P.2d
at 1229 n.5; Brown, 856 P.2d at 359.
B.

Defendant's claims fail because they were invited.

Even if this Court overlooked defendant's failure to preserve his claims below, his
claims would nonetheless fail under the invited error doctrine.
To establish plain error, defendant must show that '"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
[defendant].'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 16, 94 P.3d 186 (quoting State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). However, "while [this Court may] review
issues . . . for plain error, [it] will not save a party from error when that party 'has made a
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error.'" State v.
Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^j 41, 63 P.3d 731 (refusing to reach invited error even in capital
case) (quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)). Thus, if defendant has
9

"'affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong'" with the
manner in which matters were proceeding, the appellate court will not consider any claim
of error on appeal. State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,1f 25, 63 P.3d 110 (quoting State
v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)) (additional citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). In other words, if the trial court "gave defendant ample opportunity to
object.. ., and he failed to do so," this Court will not save defendant from any alleged
error that occurred. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109.
The invited error doctrine applies here. First, neither defendant nor his counsel, in
their written motions to the trial court, requested either an evidentiary hearing or the
appointment of new counsel (R32,33). Second and more importantly, neither defendant
nor his counsel made such a request at the subsequent hearing held on defendant's
motion, despite having the opportunity to do so. At that hearing, the trial court
specifically asked defense counsel whether he had anything further he wished to present
concerning defendant's motion. Defense counsel responded that he did not (R59:2).
Then, despite an apparent comfort with addressing the court on his own, defendant
remained silent (R32 (filing pro se withdrawal motion); R59:2).
On this record, "the trial court gave defendant ample opportunity to [present
evidence and additional argument on his withdrawal motion] . . . , and he failed to do so."
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. To the contrary, defendant "affirmatively led the trial court
to believe that there was nothing wrong" with the court ruling on defendant's motion
without further proceedings. As a consequence, defendant cannot now complain that no
10

further proceedings were held. See Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, Tf 41; Anderson, 929 P.2d at
1109; Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,1j 25.
C.

The trial court did not commit plain error in denying
defendant's motion without an evidentiary hearing where no
hearing was requested and the record consequently lacked any
evidence supporting defendant's contentions.

Even if this Court reaches the merits of defendant's evidentiary claim, the claim
fails because defendant has not established that the trial court committed obvious or
prejudicial error.
Section 77-13-6(2)(a) of the Utah Code provides that "[a] plea of guilty . .. may be
withdrawn only upon . . . a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004). A defendant can make such a showing
only "by putting forth evidence that the plea was in fact involuntary." State v. Humphrey,
2003 UT App 333, *{ 10, 79 P.3d 960 (emphasis added).
Here, defendant never asked the trial court to present evidence in support of his
withdrawal motion. Consequently, defendant presented no evidence supporting his
claims that counsel had misrepresented the potential sentences he would face absent the
plea bargain, that counsel did not perform "to the best of his ability for me," and that
defendant "was rushed through this whole matter" (R32). Indeed, as the trial judge
pointed out, he had gone "through what [defendant's] rights were in great detail and we
talked about that[,] over and over talked about it" (R59:2-3).

11

Absent any evidence to the contrary, the trial court had no basis upon which to
conclude that defendant's plea was unknowing or involuntary. See Utah Code Ann. § 7713-6(2)(a). Thus, the trial court did not err, let alone obviously err, in denying
defendant's motion to withdraw that plea. See State v. Pooler, 2002 UT App 299,17, 56
P.3d 979 (holding that, where "[defendant did not present or proffer any evidence [to the
trial court] specifying the irregularities that he now claims," the trial court did not err in
presuming that the prior proceedings were proper); State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981, 987
(Utah App. 1995) (holding that, where "[i]t was . . . defendant's responsibility to present
evidence [on the matter at issue and] [defendant failed to do so," trial court could
properly decide issue based on existing record). Cf. Billings v. State, 738 P.2d 554, 555
(Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (memorandum opinion) (upholding trial court's denial of
defendant's plea withdrawal motion where "[t]he motion did not request an evidentiary
hearing, petitioner presented no evidence in support of the motion, and no evidentiary
hearing on the motion was ever held").2

2

In support of his claim that the trial court erred in deciding his motion without an
evidentiary hearing, defendant cites to Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343-45 (Utah
App. 1988). See Aplt. Br. at 9, 14. Summers, however, was a post-conviction case, see
Summers, 759 P.2d at 343-44, which is governed by specific procedural rules, see Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -304 (West 2004); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Defendant's case
involves a motion to withdraw, not a post-conviction petition. Thus, the post-conviction
rules did not apply here. Moreover, although Summers finds error in the trial court's
dismissal of the petition without an evidentiary hearing, it is unclear in that decision
whether the petitioner had requested such a hearing.
12

Finally, even if defendant could show obvious error, his claim nonetheless fails
because defendant cannot show prejudice where nothing in the record indicates what
evidence, if any, defendant would have presented at an evidentiary hearing. Cf. State v.
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50-51 (Utah 1998) (stating, in ineffective assistance context, that
prejudice "must be a demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996)
(stating, in ineffective assistance context, that an "invitation to speculate cannot substitute
for proof of prejudice").
Consequently, defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain error in
denying his motion to withdraw without first holding an evidentiary hearing fails.
D.

The trial court did not commit plain error in denying
defendant's withdrawal motion without first appointing new
counsel where defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced
by the lack of new counsel.

Finally, even if this Court reaches defendant's claim that the trial court should
have appointed new counsel before deciding his withdrawal motion, defendant's claim
fails because he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the trial court's alleged error.
"The right to conflict-free representation is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."
State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, % 22, 984 P.2d 382. However, "to show this right was
violated, [a defendant] must establish both that [his counsel] had an actual conflict of
interest, and that the conflict adversely affected [counsel's] performance." Id.
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"To establish an actual conflict of interest, defendants must show, as a threshold
matter, that trial counsel 'was required to make a choice advancing his own interests to
the detriment of his client's interests.'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah App.
1998) (quoting State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997)) (additional internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Even then, however, if "there is no indication
t h a t . . . had counsel been substituted, the outcome would have been any better for
[defendant]," defendant's conflict of interest claim fails. Lovell, 1999 UT 40,135.
In this case, defendant has presented no evidence supporting his original
claim—made in his plea withdrawal motion—that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in advising him concerning his guilty plea. Specifically, defendant did not
request an evidentiary hearing below, nor did he move this Court to remand the matter for
an evidentiary hearing under rule 23B, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
Utah R. App. P. 23B (providing that appellate courts may remand matter to trial court for
evidentiary hearing if defendant presents "nonspeculative allegation^] of facts, not fully
appearing in the record on appeal," which, if true, support a determination that trial
counsel was ineffective).
The necessary conclusion must be that no facts exist to support defendant's
original counsel ineffectiveness claim. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,fflf16-17, 12
P.3d 92 (holding that, if defendant is aware of any non-record facts supporting his claim
of counsel's ineffectiveness, "defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of
moving for a temporary remand"; noting that "[t]he necessary consequence of this burden
14

is that an appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it
is supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware").
Absent such evidence, defendant's plain error claim that the trial court should have
appointed new counsel to argue the motion fails.
First, nothing in Utah law requires a trial court to automatically disqualify trial
counsel every time a defendant advances an unsupported, self-serving claim of counsel's
ineffectiveness. Thus, the trial court did not err, let alone obviously err, in failing to sua
sponte disqualify defendant's counsel before denying defendant's withdrawal motion
here.
Second, even if defendant could show obvious error in the trial court's failure to
sua sponte appoint new counsel, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
error. Specifically, defendant has not identified anything that new counsel would have
done in support of defendant's withdrawal motion that defendant's trial counsel did not
do. See Aplt. Br. at 10-15. Thus, defendant has not shown that, "absent the [trial court's
alleged] error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
[defendant]'" on his withdrawal motion. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 16 (citation
omitted).
Defendant's plain error claim therefore fails.3
3

Even if this Court were to find that the trial court committed plain error in
denying defendant's motion without first having an evidentiary hearing or appointing new
counsel, the remedy is not to vacate defendant's guilty plea, but rather to remand the
matter back to the trial court for appointment of new counsel and reconsideration of
defendant's withdrawal motion.
15

II.

DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL
WAS INEFFECTIVE IN NOT REQUESTING AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING OR NEW COUNSEL AFTER DEFENDANT FILED A
WITHDRAWAL MOTION WHERE DEFENDANT HAS NOT
IDENTIFIED ANYTHING NEW COUNSEL WOULD HAVE DONE
DIFFERENTLY
Defendant alternatively claims that he "received ineffective assistance of counsel

when his attorney didn't ask for conflict counsel to be appointed and when he didn't
present any evidence or argument on defendant's behalf." Aplt. Br. at 15 (capitalization
omitted). Because nothing in the record indicates that defendant was adversely affected
by his counsel's performance, defendant's claim fails.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show
both that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
"However, when an ineffectiveness claim is grounded on a conflict of interest,
[this Court] presumes prejudice if the defendant demonstrates 'that an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85
(Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted); see also State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^ 22, 984 P.2d
382. If "there is no indication t h a t . . . had counsel been substituted, the outcome would
have been any better for [defendant]," defendant has not shown that the alleged conflict
adversely affected him. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^ 35.

16

Under either test, "defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate."
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 16, 12 P.3d 92 ("If a defendant is aware of any
'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if
true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective,' Utah R. App. P. 23B,
defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary remand.").
"The necessary consequence of this burden is that an appellate court will presume that
any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence
of which defendant is aware." Id. at ^f 17.
In this case, defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel
"didn't present any evidence or argument on . . . behalf of defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea. Aplt. Br. at 15. However, as already discussed, defendant nowhere
identifies what evidence or argument counsel should have but did not present.
Consequently, defendant has not shown either that his counsel performed deficiently in
not presenting such evidence or argument, or that defendant was prejudiced by such
performance.
Similarly, although defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective because
counsel "didn't ask for conflict counsel to be appointed," Aplt. Br. at 15, defendant
presents no evidence establishing that an actual conflict existed when trial counsel
presented defendant's withdrawal motion or that, " had counsel been substituted, the
outcome would have been any better for [defendant]." Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^f 35.
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Thus, as with his plain error claims, defendant's ineffective assistance claims fail
because nothing in the record supports them.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED JX_ December 2005.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah/Attorney General
KAREN A. KLUCZNjK
Assistant Attorney General
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